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Abstract
is paper considers the core of a competitive market economy with an endogenous social di-
vision of labour. e theory is founded on the notion of a “consumer-producer”, who consumes
as well as produces commodities. First, we show that the Core of such an economy with an
endogenous social division of labour can be founded on deviations of coalitions of arbitrary
size, extending the seminal insights of Vind and Schmeidler for pure exchange economies. Fur-
thermore, we establish the equivalence between the Core and the set of competitive equilibria
for continuum economies with an endogenous social division of labour.
Our analysis also concludes that self-organisation in a social division of labour can be incor-
porated into the Edgeworthian barter process directly. is is formulated as a Core equivalence
result stated for a Structured Core concept based on renegotiations among fully specialised eco-
nomic agents, i.e., coalitions that use only fully developed internal divisions of labour.
Our approach bridges the gap between standard economies with social production and
coalition production economies. erefore, a more straightforward and natural interpreta-
tion of coalitional improvement and the Core can be developed than for coalition production
economies.
Keywords: Consumer-producer; Social division of labour; Competitive equilibrium; Core of an
economy; Core equivalence.
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1 Specialisation and the social division of labour
One of the oldest ideas to explain economic wealth creation is that through a functional social
division of labour (Plato, 380 BCE; Smith, 1776; Mandeville, 1714; Babbage, 1835). Wealth creation
in an economy with a social division of labour is founded on the interplay of two fundamental
principles, namely that there are increasing returns to specialisation and that full exploitation of
these returns is possible through the principle of gains from trade. ese principles have already
been explored in these early sources.
e principle that human capital is more productive if fully specialised in the execution of a
limited set of activities or the production of a limited set of closely related goods has been proposed
throughout the history of economic thought, but has not yet been explored fully in contemporary
economic theory. is paper proposes formal concepts that describe these effects of Increasing Re-
turns to Specialisation (IRSpec) that are weaker than the usually employed notion of Increasing
Returns to Scale (IRS). is is formalised by the conception that the convex hull of the full special-
isation production plans capture the complete production set.
We show in this paper that the property of Increasing Returns to Specialisation supports the
two fundamental functions of a social division of labour, namely the generation of economic wealth
and the allocation of that generated wealth. Indeed, specialised economic agents interact through a
competitive price mechanism that acts as a coordination device in the process of economic wealth
creation as well as a mechanism to allocate the generated wealth through the social division of
labour. To pursue this, we apply the framework developed in Yang (1988) and Yang and Ng (1993).1
is approach represents an economic decision maker as a “consumer-producer”, who is endowed
with consumptive as well as productive abilities.2 Yang presented this approach as a remedy to
the formal (social) dichotomy of consumption and production that is at the centre of the Walrasian
theory of a market economy (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; McKenzie, 1954, 1959).
However, the concept of Increasing Returns to Specialisation remains relatively unexplored
in formal models based on the notion of a consumer-producer. In particular, Sun, Yang, and Zhou
(2004) formalised a general equilibrium framework founded on themodels of Yang (1988, 2001, 2003)
and Yang and Ng (1993). In this framework, production sets of individual consumer-producers are
typically bounded as well as non-convex. ese authors restrict their model to one based on home-
based production only and investigate the existence of competitive equilibriumunder well-specified
transaction costs. is formal model omits the explicit introduction of either Increasing Returns to
Scale or Increasing Returns to Specialisation and, as a result, does not investigate the consequences
of these fundamental hypotheses. Also, the focus on home-based production excludes the trade of
intermediary inputs as part of social production processes, an essential feature of general equilib-
rium models of production economies. In the present paper we try to address these omissions.
1Alternative explorations to model the idea of wealth creation through a social division of labour have been pre-
sented in Young (1928); Stigler (1951); Blitch (1983); Kim (1989); Locay (1990) and Nakahashi and Feldman (2014). For an
overview we also refer to Steinegger (2010) and Sun (2012).
2Technically this introduces a seing that is equivalent to the notion of a “coalition production economy”
(Hildenbrand, 1970, 1974) which is also explored in Suzuki (1995), De Simone (1997) and Toda (2002). Suzuki, De Simone
and Toda focus mainly on the technical issue of the existence of an equilibrium rather than the role of specialisation in
the endogenous formation of a social division of labour.
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We introduce the Core of an economy with an endogenous social division of labour in a rather
straightforward fashion. As in coalition production economies (Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974), coali-
tions are assumed to be able to create wealth through the appropriate fine-tuning of the assigned
production plans to its constituting members. e generated outputs are then allocated for con-
sumption among the members of the coalition. is defines a standard Core concept in the seing
of an economy with endogenous social division of labour.
We are able to show that non-Core allocations can be improved upon or “blocked” by coali-
tions of arbitrary size. is extends the well-known results of Schmeidler (1972) and Vind (1972)
on blocking in pure exchange economies. Furthermore, we show that in a continuum economy
there is an equivalence between the Core and the set of competitive equilibria, fully analogous to
Aumann (1964). Our Core-equivalence result improves established insights from the literature on
coalition production economies, in particular the results for pseudo- and quasi-equilibria shown in
Hildenbrand (1968) and Oddou (1982).
In this paper we explore the introduction of a formal description of Increasing Returns to Spe-
cialisation (IRSpec) at the level of the individual consumer-producer. Formally, a production set
satisfies IRSpec if it is contained in the convex hull of production plans in which there is full spe-
cialisation in the production of a single good—subject to the free-disposal hypothesis. is property
has been hinted at by Yang (2001), Yao (2002) and Diamantaras and Gilles (2004), but has not been
developed fully in that literature. We address this omission in the present paper as well as the
companion paper on general competitive equilibrium in an economy with an endogenous social
division of labour, Gilles (2019).
Finally, under IRSpec, any Core allocation can be improved upon by a coalition of fully spe-
cialised individuals. In particular, this coalition consists of non-negligible subcoalitions of consumer-
producers that are specialised in the production each of the marketable commodities. is insight
is related to the result of Grodal (1972) for coalition production economies.
Outline of the paper
In the second section of the paper we set up the model of a consumer-producer, in particular a
generalised model of production already developed in Gilles (2019). is allows the introduction of
the production of goods through an adaptable social division of labour based on the principles of
increasing returns to specialisation and gains from trade.
Section 3 introduces the notion of an economy with an endogenous social division of labour
and defines the notion of a competitive equilibrium. Subsequently, we introduce the notion of
coalitional improvements and the concept of a Core allocation. We show that in this seing non-
Core allocations can be blocked by coalitions of arbitrary, predetermined size, including arbitrarily
large and arbitrarily small coalitions, extending the insights of Vind (1972) and Schmeidler (1972) to
economieswith production. We also extend the standard Core equivalence result that in continuum
economies all Core allocations are competitive equilibrium allocations.
Finally, in Section 3 we explore an extension of the Core, capturing that only coalitions in which
members are fully specialised are able to improve upon a given allocation. We show that these δ -
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Core allocations are fully equivalent to the Core allocations as well as the competitive equilibrium
allocations in a continuum economy in which all agents have access to the same productive spe-
cialisations.
All proofs of the main results are collected in several appendices.
2 Economies with a social division of labour
roughout, we consider that there are ℓ > 2 marketable commodities. e commodity space is
therefore represented as the ℓ-dimensional Euclidean space Rℓ and the consumption space is its
nonnegative orthant Rℓ
+
. e commodity space represents all bundles of tradable goods in this
economy. In particular, for k = 1, . . . , ℓ we denote by ek = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) the k-th unit
bundle in Rℓ
+
and by e = (1, . . . , 1) the bundle consisting of one unit of each good.3
In this paper we consider an economy with a diversified production sector, which is founded on
the hypothesis that all agents are participating directly in the production as well as the consumption
of goods. Hence, the production in this economy is founded on an endogenous social division of
labour that emanates from decisions of all individual economic agents. Consequently, economic
agents are modelled as consumer-producers—a notion formally conceived by Yang (1988).
2.1 Introducing consumer-producers
A consumer-producer is formally introduced as a pair (u,P), whereu : Rℓ
+
→ R is a utility function
representing the agent’s consumptive preferences and P ⊂ Rℓ is the agent’s production set consist-
ing of production plans. Normally we can write every production plan y ∈ P as y = y+−y−, where
y+ = y ∨ 0 is the corresponding vector of output quantities and y− = (−y) ∨ 0 is the corresponding
vector of input quantities.
We also assume that there can be non-marketable inputs in the production process described
by P—such as the agent’s labour time and land resources—that are not explicitly modelled. We
facilitate the possibility that all outputs are generated using non-marketable inputs only. is is
referred to as “home” production. e approach to the modelling of production introduced here is
similar to the one set out for coalition production economies in Sondermann (1974, Section 2.1).4
In this paper, the concept of a consumer-producer is introduced in a more general fashion
than considered in Yang (2001), Yao (2002), Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004) and Diamantaras and Gilles
(2004). In those papers, a consumer-producer is endowed with one unit of non-marketable labour
time which can be allocated to either consumption as leisure or as production of any of the con-
sidered marketable commodities. Here, instead, we dispense of the explicit introduction of labour
time and simplify the framework by considering production sets similar to the ones used in standard
general equilibrium theory with inputs and outputs.
3roughout, we employ the vector inequality notation that x > x ′ if xk > x
′
k
for all commodities k = 1, . . . , ℓ;
x > x ′ if x > x ′ and x , x ′; and x ≫ x ′ if xk > x
′
k
for all commodities k = 1, . . . , ℓ.
4In a coalition production economy, productive abilities are assigned to coalitions of economic agents. For further
discussion of coalition production economies I refer to Hildenbrand (1970); Sondermann (1974); Oddou (1982) and Basile
(1993).
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With regard to our approach to production, in the production set Pa of consumer-producer
a ∈ A, we distinguish two types of inputs: Marketable inputs, which are part of the ℓ commodities
introduced above, and non-marketable inputs, which are assumed to be outside the realm of the
commodity space.
Regularity assumptions. e next assumption brings together the regularity properties that
one expects to be satisfied by the basic descriptors of the consumptive and productive abilities of a
consumer-producer.
Axiom 2.1 roughout this paper, we assume that every agent is a consumer-producer represented
by (u,P), satisfying the following properties:
(i) e utility functionu : Rℓ
+
→ R is continuous on the consumption space Rℓ
+
and monotone in
the sense that for all consumption bundles x,x ′ ∈ Rℓ
+
with x ≫ x ′ it holds that u(x) > u(x ′).
(ii) e production set P ⊂ Rℓ is regular in the sense that P is a closed set that is bounded from
above, 0 ∈ P and it is comprehensive in the sense that
P − Rℓ
+
≡ {y − z |y ∈ P and z > 0 } ⊂ P. (1)
(iii) e production set P ⊂ Rℓ is non-trivial in the sense that
Conv (P) ∩ Rℓ
+
\ {0} , , (2)
i.e., there exists some z > 0 with z ∈ ConvP.5
Axiom 2.1(i) imposes that we only consider “regular” preferences in this economy. e imposed
properties of continuity and (weak) monotonicity are standard assumptions in the general equi-
librium literature. For certain results, we impose the additional assumption that preferences are
strictly monotone in the sense that u(x) > u(x ′) for all x > x ′.
Furthermore, Axiom 2.1(ii) imposes that we only consider production sets that satisfy certain
standard regularity properties. In particular, a regular production set satisfies the properties that
one has the ability to cease production altogether and the assumption of free disposal in production.
Both properties are used throughout general equilibrium theory.
Also, it is natural to assume that due to their size individual consumer-producers can only
manage bounded production processes and are not able to grow their operations arbitrarily. is is
expressed through the property that there is an upper bound on the individual’s production set.
Note that regularity does not include convexity, allowing production to exhibit non-convexities,
in particular increasing returns to scale and specialisation, introducing constructions of production
sets developed in the existing literature on economies with an endogenous social division of labour
(Yang, 1988, 2001; Sun, Yang, and Zhou, 2004; Gilles, 2019).
Finally, Axiom 2.1(iii) requires that production is non-trivial and that economic agents can
achieve a meaningful productive output. e stated property implies that economic agents can
5Here, we denote by Conv (X ) = {λx + (1 − λ)y | x,y ∈ X and 0 6 λ 6 1} the convex hull of the set X .
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produce certain outputs without using too much inputs. is implies that all economic agents are
assumed to have meaningful productive abilities and can contribute to the social economy produc-
tively.
2.2 Defining an economy based on a social division of labour
e set of agents is denoted by A and a typical economic agent is a ∈ A. In this paper, A is either a
finite set or a continuum endowed with a complete, atomless probability measure to determine the
size of coalitions in the population.6 Formally, we let A be an arbitrary set of economic consumer-
producers represented by (ua ,Pa ). Let Σ ⊂ 2
A be a well-chosen σ -algebra of measurable coalitions
in A and let µ : Σ → [0, 1] be a complete probability measure on (A, Σ).
We distinguish two standard cases: (1) A = {1, . . . ,n} is a countable set, Σ = 2A is the class of
all subsets of A7 and µ is the normalised counting measure on Σ. (2) A is an uncountably infinite
set, Σ is a σ -algebra of measurable subsets of A and µ is an atomless probability measure on Σ. In
the remainder of this paper case (1) is denoted as a “finite” economy. e second case (2) is denoted
as a “continuum” economy.
We now develop the model of an economy in which all agents are represented as consumer-
producers and simultaneouslymake decisions regarding consumption and production under a given
vector of competitive market prices. It is implicitly assumed that all consumer-producers are pow-
erless to influence the price level through their consumption and/or production decisions. Hence,
the model is a direct extension of the standard model of an economy with (social) production.
Definition 2.2 An economy with ℓ commodities is a triple E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 where
(i) (A, Σ, µ) is a complete probability space of consumer-producers, represented by (ua ,Pa ) for
every a ∈ A;
(ii) e utility function u(·,x) : A→ R is measurable on the probability space (A, Σ, µ);
(iii) e correspondence of production sets P : A→ 2R
ℓ
+ has a measurable graph on the probability
space (A, Σ, µ) such that the correspondence P is integrably bounded from above8 and;
(iv) For every agent a ∈ A the pair (ua ,Pa ) satisfies Axiom 2.1.
An economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a continuum economy if the complete probability space of
consumer-producers (A, Σ, µ) is atomless.
An allocation in an economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a pair (f ,д) where f : A→ Rℓ
+
is an integrable
assignment of final consumption bundles and д is an integrable selection of the production corre-
spondence P. us, an allocation (f ,д) consists of a consumption plan f and a social production
plan д.
6ere also is the possibility to consider mixed cases as well in which there is a continuum of negligible agents and
countably many non-negligible agents, represented by atoms (Shitovitz, 1973, 1982). We do not address these cases in
the theory developed in this paper.
7On a non-finite, countable agent setA, Σ can also be interpreted here as the σ -algebra generated by the finite subsets
of A.
8Hence, we impose that there exists some integrable function д : A→ Rℓ such that for almost every agent a ∈ A and
every production plan y ∈ PA : y 6 д(a).
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An allocation (f ,д) is now feasible if all allocated consumption bundles are covered by the
produced quantities of all commodities, i.e.,
∫
f dµ 6
∫
дdµ . (3)
3 Competitive equilibria and the Core
e consumer-producer problem. An individual consumer-producer a ∈ A operating in a sys-
tem of perfectly competitive markets faces a vector p ∈ Rℓ
+
\ {0} of prices for the ℓ marketable
commodities. Consequently, she optimises her utility over the set of the feasible consumption-
production plans with the goal to maximise consumptive satisfaction. is optimisation problem is
denoted as the “consumer-producer problem”:
Every consumer-producer a ∈ A aims to select a consumption plan xˆ ∈ Rℓ
+
and production plan
yˆ ∈ Rℓ such that (xˆ , yˆ) solves
max
{
ua (x)
x ∈ Rℓ
+
, y ∈ Pa and p · x 6 p · y
}
. (4)
In this statement, xˆ ∈ Rℓ
+
denotes the final consumption bundle, while yˆ ∈ Rℓ is referred to as
the production plan executed by agent a. Now, t = yˆ−xˆ ∈ Rℓ is the vector of net trades submied
to the market.
We first establish that the consumer-producer problem stated here has actually a solution under
the regularity conditions imposed.
Lemma 3.1 (Solution to the Consumer-Producer Problem)
Let a ∈ A and let (ua ,Pa ) satisfy regularity Axiom 2.1. en the consumer-producer problem for a ∈ A
stated in (4) has a solution for any strictly positive price vector p ≫ 0.
A proof of this existence result follows immediately from the weak dichotomy between the con-
sumption and production decisions stated in Gilles (2019).
Competitive equilibria. An equilibrium in an economy can now be introduced as a feasible
allocation that is supported by a price vector forwhich nearly all consumer-producers select optimal
consumption and production plans.
Definition 3.2 Consider an economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉.
An allocation (f ,д) is a competitive equilibrium in E if (f ,д) is feasible and there exists some
strictly positive price vector p ≫ 0 such that
∫
f dµ =
∫
дdµ and for almost every agent a ∈ A, the
consumption-production plan (f (a),д(a)) solve a’s consumer-producer problem (4).
e price vector p is denoted as an equilibrium price for the equilibrium allocation (f ,д).
e collection of all equilibrium allocations in the economy E is denoted by
W(E) = {(f ,д) | (f ,д) is a competitive equilibrium in E}. (5)
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We restrict our focus on competitive equilibria with strictly positive equilibrium prices only. is
restriction ismore plausible in the seing of an economywith agent-based production as considered
here. is restriction also strengthens the Core equivalence result developed subsequently in this
paper, since it reduces the size of the set of considered equilibria in the economy.
e existence of competitive equilibria in these economies with an endogenous social division
of labour is addressed in Gilles (2019), in particular Section 3 and eorem 3.6. ere it is shown
that to show existence of meaningful competitive equilibria, the production sets of the consumer-
producers in the economyhave to satisfy properties describing Increasing Returns to Specialisation.
We refer to Section 4 of this paper for an elaborate discussion.
A Core concept. e Core of a continuum economy with production was seminally set out in
Hildenbrand (1968). e model proposed was that of a coalition production economy in which
production was assigned to coalitions rather than separate social production organisations or “pro-
ducers”. In our notion of an economywith an endogenous social division of labour, production is as-
signed to the consumer-producers individually, which results in a natural formulation of coalitional
improvement in the Edgeworthian bargaining process. Consequently, we are able to formulate the
concept of an Edgeworthian Core allocation in a rather straightforward fashion.
Definition 3.3 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some economy. A coalition S ∈ Σ is able to improve
upon an allocation (f ,д) in E if S is non-negligible in the sense that µ(S) > 0 and there exists a
coalitional allocation (f ′,д′) : S → Rℓ
+
× Rℓ such that
(i) ua (f
′(a) ) > ua(f (a)) for almost every agent a ∈ S , and
(ii)
∫
S
f ′dµ 6
∫
S
д′dµ .
A feasible allocation (f ,д) in E is a Core allocation if there is no coalition S ∈ Σ that can improve
upon it. We denote by
C(E) = {(f ,д) | (f ,д) is a Core allocation } (6)
the Core of the economy E.
A coalition that can improve upon a given allocation is also known as a blocking coalition.
3.1 An extension of the Vind-Schmeidler eorem.
One of the classical questions in mathematical economics has beenwhat type of blocking coalitions
there are. One particular question is about the size of the blocking coalition. is was pursued in
Schmeidler (1972); Grodal (1972); Vind (1972) and Greenberg, Weber, and Yamazaki (2007). ese
results can quite naturally be transferred to the seing of an economy with an endogenous social
division of labour.
e next result addresses the size of blocking coalitions there emerge in a continuum economy.
It extends the insights from Schmeidler (1972) and Vind (1972) to the realm of continuum economies
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with an endogenous social division of labour. In particular, in the context of our notion of an econ-
omy, the concept of a consumer-producer incorporates the property that production is completely
scalable as well through the adaptation of the social division of labour. is property carries over
to blocking coalitions in the sense that improving on a proposed allocation can be done through a
set of completely specialised coalitions of consumer-producers.
eorem 3.4 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some continuum economy, in which (A, Σ, µ) is a complete
atomless probability space for which the properties stated in Definition 2.2 hold and all preferences are
strictly monotone. Let 0 < δ < 1 be any real number. en for any non-Core allocation (f ,д) in E,
there exists a blocking coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) = δ .
For a proof of eorem 3.4 we refer to Appendix A of this paper.
3.2 Core equivalence
One of the classical results from the Edgeworthian approach to trade has been the Core equivalence
theorem, seminally established for pure exchange economies by Aumann (1964) and for coalition
production economies by Hildenbrand (1968). Here, we are able to establish full Core equivalence
for a continuum economy with an endogenous social division of labour, supplementing the results
stated in Hildenbrand (1968, 1974) for coalition production economies. We are able to establish
the equivalence of the Core and the set of competitive equilibria supported by strictly positive
prices for economieswith an endogenous social division of labour under the acceptedmonotonicity
hypotheses.
eorem 3.5 (Core Equivalence)
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some economy that satisfies the properties stated in Definition 2.2.
(a) Every competitive equilibrium in E is a Core allocation.
(b) If (A, Σ, µ) is an atomless probability space and all utility functions ua , a ∈ A, are strictly
monotone, then every Core allocation in E can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with
a strictly positive equilibrium price vector, i.e., C(E) =W(E).
A proof of eorem 3.5 is provided in Appendix B of this paper.
e Core equivalence result establishes that our framework is a natural representation of modelling
production in a continuum economywithout relying onweaker concepts such as pseudo- and quasi-
equilibria.
4 e Core and the social division of labour
4.1 Increasing returns to specialisation
e generation of economic wealth in a social division of labour is founded on the presence of
increasing returns to specialisation: Specialising in the production of a single good leads to dispro-
portional increases in the marginal product of that particular good. In the framework developed
here, this fundamental hypothesis is introduced in two forms.
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Definition 4.1 Consider a production set P ⊂ Rℓ satisfying the properties stated in Axiom 2.1.
Full specialisation: Let k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} be some commodity. A production plan zk ∈ P is a full
specialisation production plan for commodity k if there exists some positive output quantity
Qk > 0 and some input vector yk ∈ Rℓ
+
with yk
k
= 0 such that zk = Qkek − y
k .
IRSpec: e production set P exhibits Increasing Returns to Specialisation if for every commod-
ity k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} there exists some full specialisation production plan zk = Qkek −y
k ∈ P such
that 9
Q ⊂ P ⊂ ConvQ − Rℓ
+
(7)
where Q =
{
z1, . . . , zℓ
}
is the set of these ℓ full specialisation production plans.
e definition above reflects the traditional idea underpinning the social division of labour (Smith,
1776, Chapter 1) that specialising in the production of a single good increases one’s productivity.
If a production set exhibits IRSpec, the production set is simply non-convex with the maximal
production bundles achieved along the ℓ full specialisation production plans. Here,Qk > 0 denotes
the quantity of good k that the consumer-producer can produce under full specialisation, requiring
input vector yk > 0. is notion was seminally introduced in Gilles (2019), where two variations
of Increasing Returns to Specialisation are considered. e property introduced here is denoted as
Weakly Increasing Returns to Specialisation (WIRSpec) in Gilles (2019).10
Obviously, WIRSpec implies that the production set P is strictly bounded. We also remark
that, if P is home-based, then P satisfies WIRSpec if there exist output quantities Qk > 0 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} with P ⊂ ConvQ − Rℓ
+
where Q =
{
Q1e1, . . . ,Q
ℓeℓ
}
.
For an elaborate discussion of these concepts and their consequences we also refer to Gilles
(2019).
4.2 A Structured Core concept
For the subsequent discussion of the role of the social division of labour in the Edgeworthian trade
processes underlying the Core, we need to introduce the notion that the production of goods in an
economy is founded on a given set of professions or specialisations. In particular, we focus on the
ability of professional associations or guilds to arise that can exercise the power to block a certain
allocation. is underlies the following definition of a modification of the Core concept.
Definition 4.2 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some economy satisfying the properties of Definition 2.2
such that almost all agents are endowed with a production set that satisfies IRSpec.
Denote by Qa ⊂ R
ℓ the set of ℓ full specialisation production plans for agent a ∈ A with the property
that Qa ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQa − R
ℓ
+
, as introduced in Definition 4.1.
9Here, we use the notational convention that Conv S = {λx + (1 − λ)y | x,y ∈ S and 0 6 λ 6 1} denotes the convex
hull of the set S .
10Gilles (2019) also introduces the related notion of Strictly Increasing Returns to Specialisation (SIRSpec), which
additionally imposes that P ∩ (ConvQ) = Q. is imposes that there are strict productivity increases from specialising
in the production of a single output. is implies that income maximisers are exactly those full specialisation production
plans.
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(i) Let S ∈ Σwith µ(S) > 0 be a non-negligible coalition. A production planд : S → Rℓstructures
the coalition S through an internal social division of labour if for every k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} there
exists a coalition Sk ∈ Σ with µ(Sk ) > 0 such that
1. {S1, . . . ,Sℓ} partitions S , i.e., S = ∪
ℓ
k=1
Sk and Sm ∩ Sm′ =  for allm ,m
′ and;
2. every agent a ∈ Sk is specialised in the production of commodity k only, in the sense
that д(a) = Qk (a)ek − y
k (a) ∈ Qa ⊂ Pa is a full specialisation production plan for
commodity k for agent a ∈ Sk .
(ii) e allocation (f ,д) is a Structured Core allocation if there is no non-negligible coalition
S ∈ Σwith µ(S) > 0 that can improve upon (f ,д) through an allocation (f ′,д′) : S → Rℓ
+
×Rℓ
such that the production plan д′ structures the coalition S through an internal social division
of labour.
e collection of all Structured Core allocations in E is denoted by CS (E).
A coalition that organises itself through an internal social division of labour based on full specialisa-
tion production plans only can be interpreted as an alliance between ℓ different professional guilds,
which members specialise in the production of only one good. e Structured Core now collects
exactly those allocations that cannot be blocked through such alliances. It means that trade only
occurs between fully specialised economic agents in the prevailing social division of labour. is
imposes restrictions on blocking, typically enlarging the Core considerably, i.e., C(E) ⊂ CS (E).
e next theorem asserts that there is an equivalence between Core and Structured Core alloca-
tions in continuum economies in which the production technologies satisfy the increasing returns
to specialisation (IRSpec) property, subject to standard regularity conditions on the preferences of
the economic agents.
eorem 4.3 (Structured Core Equivalence)
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be a continuum economy, for which the assumptions formulated in Definition
2.2 hold and almost all agents are endowed with a production set that satisfies IRSpec.
en, if all utility functionsua , a ∈ A, are strictly monotone, every non-Core allocation can be improved
upon by a non-negligible coalition S ∈ Σ with an internal social division of labour, i.e.,
CS (E) = C(E) =W(E).
A proof of eorem 4.3 is provided in Appendix C.
Using the proof of eorem 3.4, a simple modification of the proof of eorem 4.3 implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.4 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be a continuum economy, for which the assumptions for-
mulated in Definition 2.2 hold and almost all agents are endowed with a production set that satisfies
IRSpec. Let 0 6 δ 6 1.
en, if all utility functionsua , a ∈ A, are strictly monotone, every non-Core allocation can be improved
upon by a non-negligible coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) = δ that is structured through an internal social
division of labour.
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4.3 Structured Equilibria under IRSpec
Under the Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec) property of the productive abilities of the
consumer-producers in an economy, Gilles (2019) showed that the selected production plans un-
der any positive price vector are fully specialised (Gilles, 2019, eorem 2.7). is gives rise to
introducing a class of competitive equilibria that incorporate this property.
Definition 4.5 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy, for which the assumptions formulated in
Definition 2.2 hold and almost all agents a ∈ A are endowed with a production set Pa that satisfies
IRSpec for the set of ℓ full specialisation production plans Qa = {z
1
a , . . . , z
ℓ
a}.
An allocation (f ,д) is a structured equilibrium in E if there exists a positive price vector p ≫ 0 such
that
∫
f dµ =
∫
дdµ and for almost every agent a ∈ A, the consumption-production plan (f (a),д(a))
solve a’s consumer-producer problem (4) with д(a) ∈ Qa .
e class of structured equilibria of E is denoted byWS (E) ⊂ W(E).
e notion of a structured equilibrium refers to the endogenous organisation of the economy
through a social division of labour through a price mechanism as seminally alluded to by Smith
(1759, 1776) as his “invisible hand” mechanism. Here I am particularly interested in the question
whether interactions within coalitions that are internally organised through an appropriately cho-
sen social division of labour lead to outcomes that are exactly those identified structured equilibria.
Hence, do interactions in structured coalitions result in global outcomes that are guided through a
price-based invisible hand to a global social division of labour?
Our insights indeed confirm that this is the case. Formally, this can be stated as a corollary
from the previously shown insights. In particular, application of eorem 2.7 of Gilles (2019) and
the Structured Core Equivalence eorem 4.3 results in the following corollary:
Corollary 4.6 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy, for which the assumptions formulated in
Definition 2.2 hold and almost all agents a ∈ A are endowed with a production set Pa that satisfies
IRSpec for the set of ℓ full specialisation production plans Qa .
en, if all utility functions ua , a ∈ A, are strictly monotone, then every structured core allocation can
be supported as a structured equilibrium, i.e.,
CS (E) = C(E) =W(E) =WS (E).
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Appendices: Proofs of the main theorems
A Proof of eorem 3.4
Consider a continuum economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 such that (A, Σ, µ) is atomless. Let (f ,д) be
some non-Core allocation in E. Hence, there exists some S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 and a coalitional
allocation (f ′,д′) with f ′ : S → Rℓ
+
and д′ : S → Rℓ such that
(i) ua (f
′(a)) > ua(f (a)) ≡ u¯a for every a ∈ S ;
(ii) д′(a) ∈ Pa for every a ∈ S , and;
(iii)
∫
S
f ′dµ =
∫
S
д′dµ.
Let 0 < δ < 1. We now consider three cases:
z µ(S) = δ
In this case the assertion of eorem 3.4 is satisfied for S itself.
z µ(S) > δ
A proof can easily be constructed on the argument introduced in Schmeidler (1972). Indeed, intro-
duce a multi-dimensional measure ν : Σ → Rℓ+1
+
on (A, Σ, µ) restricted to S by
ν(T ) =
(∫
T
(f ′ − д′)dµ , µ(T )
)
∈ Rℓ+1
+
for any T ⊂ S (8)
Now by Liapunov’s Convexity eorem, e.g., eorem 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 62), it follows
that ν results in a convex image.
Obviously ν() = (0, . . . , 0, 0) and ν(S) = (0, . . . , 0, µ(S)). Hence, there has to exist some T ⊂ S
such that ν(T ) = (0, . . . , 0,δ ). Clearly the coalition T now improves upon (f ,д) through (f ′,д′)
such that µ(T ) = δ , showing the assertion.
z µ(S) < δ
We modify the proof seminally devised by Vind (1972). Let 0 < ε < 1 be arbitrarily chosen.
Since the restricted probability space (S, ΣS , µ) is atomless as well, we know by Liapunov’s Con-
vexity eorem that
∫
S
Pa dµ(a) ⊂ R
ℓ
+
is a convex set. Hence, there exists an integrable selection
дˆ : S → Rℓ
+
such that дˆ(a) ∈ Pa for a ∈ S and∫
S
дˆ dµ = ε
∫
S
д′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
дdµ (9)
Furthermore, the continuity (Axiom 2.1(i)) and measurability of all preferences implies that there
exists f ′′ : S → Rℓ
+
with
ua (f
′′(a) ) > u¯a for every a ∈ S∫
S
f ′′dµ =
∫
S
д′dµ − y for some y > 0.
Since the correspondence {x ∈ Rℓ
+
| ua(x) > u¯a} is measurable on S , by Liapunov’s Convexity
eorem it follows that∫
S
{
x ∈ Rℓ
+
 ua(x) > u¯a } dµ(a) ⊂ Rℓ+
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is a convex set. Hence, since
∫
S
f ′′dµ is in this integral and
∫
S
f dµ is on its boundary, there exists
some integrable selection fˆ : S → Rℓ
+
such that
ua
(
fˆ (a)
)
> u¯a for every a ∈ S (10)∫
S
fˆ dµ = ε
∫
S
f ′′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
f dµ (11)
Since µ is atomless, we can now take T ⊂ A \ S with T ∈ Σ, µ(T ) = (1 − ε)µ(A \ S) > 0 and∫
T
(f − д)dµ = (1 − ε)
∫
A\S
(f − д)dµ . (12)
Now consider the coalition S ∪T ∈ Σ and define the allocation
(
f˜ , д˜
)
by
f˜ (a) =


fˆ (a) a ∈ S
f (a) + ε
µ(T )
y a ∈ T
and д˜(a) =


дˆ(a) a ∈ S
д(a) a ∈ T
.
Now it follows easily from the above that for a ∈ S
ua
(
f˜ (a)
)
= ua
(
fˆ (a)
)
> u¯a
and, due to strict monotonicity of ua , for every a ∈ T
ua
(
f˜ (a)
)
= ua
(
f (a) + ε
µ(T )
y
)
> u¯a .
Moreover, we establish that∫
S∪T
f˜ dµ =
∫
S
fˆ dµ +
∫
T
f dµ + εy = ε
∫
S
f ′′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
f dµ +
∫
T
f dµ + εy =
= ε
∫
S
д′dµ − εy + (1 − ε)
∫
S
f dµ +
∫
T
f dµ + εy =
= ε
∫
S
д′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
f dµ +
∫
T
(f − д)dµ +
∫
T
дdµ =
= ε
∫
S
д′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
f dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
A\S
(f − д)dµ +
∫
T
дdµ =
= ε
∫
S
д′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
дdµ − (1 − ε)
∫
A\S
дdµ +
∫
T
дdµ =
= ε
∫
S
д′dµ + (1 − ε)
∫
S
дdµ +
∫
T
дdµ =
∫
S
дˆ dµ +
∫
T
дdµ =
∫
S∪T
д˜ dµ
is shows that S ∪T can improve upon (f ,д) through
(
f˜ , д˜
)
. Now select
ε =
1 − δ
1 − µ(S)
(13)
then it is easily established that 0 < ε < 1—since 0 < µ(S) < δ < 1—and that
µ(S ∪T ) = µ(S) + (1 − ε)µ(A \ S) = δ .
is completes the proof of the assertion.
15
B Proof of eorem 3.5
B.1 Proof of eorem 3.5(a)
Suppose that (f ,д) is a competitive equilibrium in the economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 for the equi-
librium price p ∈ Rℓ
+
with p ≫ 0.
Suppose to the contrary that (f ,д) is not a Core allocation in E. en there exists some non-
negligible coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 and a pair (f ′,д′) such that д′(a) ∈ Pa for all a ∈ S ,
ua(f
′(a)) > ua(f (a)) for all a ∈ S and
∫
S
f ′dµ 6
∫
S
д′dµ.
From the assumption thatua(f
′(a)) > ua(f (a)) for all a ∈ S , it follows from the consumer-producer
problem for all a ∈ S that p · f ′(a) > p · д(a) > p · д′(a) for almost all a ∈ S .11 Hence,
p ·
∫
S
f ′dµ =
∫
S
p · f ′(a)dµ(a) >
∫
S
p · д′(a)dµ(a) = p ·
∫
S
д′dµ .
is contradicts the assumed property that
∫
S
f ′dµ 6
∫
S
д′dµ. Hence, we have shown the assertion.
B.2 Proof of eorem 3.5(b)
e proof of this assertion is a modification of the standard methodology introduced by Aumann
(1964) and elaborated in Hildenbrand (1974, Section 2.1).
Let (f ,д) be a Core allocation in the continuum economy E. For every agent a ∈ A we define the
consumption bundles that are preferred to f (a) by
U(a) =
{
x ∈ Rℓ
+
 ua (x) > ua (f (a)) } (14)
Also, define for a ∈ A :
Z(a) = {U(a) − Pa } ∪ {0} ⊂ R
ℓ (15)
enU : A։ Rℓ
+
is a measurable correspondence and as a consequence,Z : A։ Rℓ is a measur-
able correspondence as well. Now by standard arguments (Hildenbrand, 1974, eorem 3, page 62),∫
Z dµ is convex and non-empty. (In particular, 0 ∈
∫
Z dµ.)
We explore the properties of the correspondenceZ through a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma B.1
∫
Z dµ ∩ Rℓ− = {0}.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that the claim does not hold. en there exists an integrable selec-
tion h : A→ Rℓ such that h(a) ∈ Z(a) for almost all a ∈ A and
∫
hdµ < 0.
Next, let S = {a ∈ A | h(a) , 0} ∈ Σ. Since
∫
hdµ < 0 it holds that µ(S) > 0.
erefore, there exist integrable selections f ′ inU and д′ in P such that h = f ′ − д′ with h(a) = 0
if a < S . For every agent a ∈ S we let
f ′′(a) = f ′(a) −
1
µ(S)
∫
hdµ ∈ Rℓ
+
(16)
In particular, since
∫
hdµ < 0, it holds that f ′′(a) > f ′(a) for every a ∈ S and, therefore, by strict
monotonicity of a’s preferences we conclude that
ua (f
′′(a)) > ua (f
′(a)) > ua (f (a))
11Here, note that p · д(a) = maxp · Pa is the maximal income that agent a can generate in this economy under price
vector p ≫ 0. is follows from the fact that (f (a),д(a)) is a solution to a’s consumer-producer problem. See also Gilles
(2019, eorem 2.4).
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Also, we can easily establish that by definition∫
S
f ′′dµ =
∫
S
f ′dµ −
∫
hdµ =
=
∫
S
f ′dµ −
∫
S
hdµ =
∫
S
д′dµ .
us, the coalition S is able to improve upon (f ,д) through the coalitional allocation (f ′′,д′). is
contradicts the hypothesis that (f ,д) is a Core allocation. us, we have shown the assertion of
Lemma B.1.
Now by Lemma B.1 we may apply Minkowski’s Separation eorem (Hildenbrand, 1974, page 38)
to
∫
Z dµ and Rℓ−. erefore, there exists a normal vector p > 0 such that p ·
∫
Z dµ > 0.
Hence, inf p · Z(a) > 0 for almost every a ∈ A. In particular, since 0 ∈ Z(a), it follows that
inf p · Z(a) = 0.
So, we conclude now that for every x ∈ Rℓ
+
:
ua (x) > ua(f (a)) implies p · x > I (a,p) ≡ supp · Pa (17)
is now leads to the following claims:
Lemma B.2 For almost every a ∈ A : p · f (a) = I (a,p) > 0.
Proof. Let a ∈ A. By continuity of the utility function ua it follows from (17) that p · f (a) > I (a,p).
Now suppose that the assertion of LemmaB.2 is not true, then there exists a coalitionS with µ(S) > 0
and for all a ∈ S : p · f (a) > I (a,p). en
p ·
∫
f dµ >
∫
I (·,p)dµ > p ·
∫
дdµ .
Since p > 0, this property contradicts that (f ,д) is feasible. Hence, p · f (a) = I (a,p).
Finally, by Axiom 2.1(iii), for a ∈ A there exists some strictly positive vector za > 0 in the convex
hull of the production set Pa , i.e., za ∈ ConvPa . Hence, since p > 0, we conclude that I (a,p) =
supp · Pa > p · za > 0, leading to the conclusion that Lemma B.2 holds.
Lemma B.3 For almost every a ∈ A : p · д(a) = I (a,p).
Proof. Since д(a) ∈ Pa it follows that p · д(a) 6 I (a,p). Suppose that the assertion of Lemma B.3
is not true, then there exists a coalition S with µ(S) > 0 and p · д(a) < I (a,p). Since by Lemma B.2,
p · f (a) = I (a,p) for almost all a ∈ A, we conclude that
p ·
∫
f dµ =
∫
I (a,p)dµ(a) > p ·
∫
д dµ .
Hence, by p > 0,
∫
f dµ >
∫
дdµ, which contradicts the feasibility of (f ,д). us we have shown
the validity of Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.4 For almost every a ∈ A : f (a) is ua-maximal in the budget set
B(a,p) =
{
x ∈ Rℓ
+
 p · x 6 I (a,p) } , .
Proof. Suppose 0 6 p · x < I (a,p) for x ∈ Rℓ
+
, then, by (17), ua(x) 6 ua(f (a)).
Suppose p · x = I (a,p) for x ∈ Rℓ
+
, then there exists a sequence xn → x with p · xn < I (a,p). us,
we conclude that by continuity of ua , ua(x) 6 ua(f (a)) as well.
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Lemma B.5 From strict monotonicity of all agents’ preferences, it follows that p ≫ 0 and I (a,p) > 0
for almost every agent a ∈ A.
Proof. If p > 0 is such that at least one good k ∈ {1, . . .′ ℓ} has a zero price pk = 0, it follows that
f ′(a) = f (a) + ek ∈ B(a,p) for almost all agents a ∈ A. By strict monotonicity of ua it then follows
that ua(f
′(a)) > ua (f (a)), which contradicts Lemma B.4. is implies that p ≫ 0.
Furthermore, by Axiom 2.1(iii), for every a ∈ A there exists some positive vector za > 0 in the
convex hull of the production set Pa , i.e., za ∈ ConvPa . Hence, since p ≫ 0, we conclude that
I (a,p) = supp · Pa > p · za > 0. is proves Lemma B.5.
e property that p ≫ 0 (Lemma B.5) together with the assertions stated in Lemmas B.3 and B.4
imply that the allocation (f ,д) is indeed a competitive equilibrium supported by the price vector p.
is proves the assertion of eorem 3.5(b).
C Proof of eorem 4.3
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some continuum economy, in which (A, Σ, µ) is a complete atomless
probability space for which the assumptions introduced in Axiom 2.1 and Definition 2.2 hold and
all utility functions ua , a ∈ A, are strictly monotone. As stated in the assertion, we also suppose
that all agents in E have productive abilities that are subject to Increasing Returns to Specialisation
(IRSpec), i.e., for almost every agent a ∈ A : Q(a) ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQ(a) − R
ℓ
+
, where
Q(a) =
{
Q1(a)e1 − y
1(a), . . . ,Qℓ(a)eℓ − y
ℓ(a)
}
. (18)
for well-selected output levels Qk (a) > 0 and input vectors yk (a) ∈ Rℓ
+
for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
We introduce some auxiliary notation. In particular, we define for every a ∈ A :
Q(a) = ConvQ(a) (19)
Now we can prove the following assertion:
Lemma C.1 e correspondences Q : A→ 2R
ℓ
and Q : A→ 2R
ℓ
have a measurable graph.
Proof. First, as assumed in Definition 2.2, the correspondence P : A → 2R
ℓ
has a measurable
graph and is closed-valued. From the IRSpec property it follows that for every a ∈ A and for every
k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} the maximisation problem
maxϕk (x) = ek · x such that x ∈ Pa
has a unique solution given by ϕk (z
a
k
) = Qk (a) with za
k
= Qk (a)ek − y
k (a) ∈ Q(a).
Proposition 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 60) now implies that a 7→ za
k
is a measurable function on
the complete probability space (A, Σ, µ). is, in turn, implies that
a 7→ Q(a) =
{
Q1(a)e1 − y
1(a), . . . ,Qℓ(a)eℓ − y
ℓ(a)
}
=
ℓ⋃
k=1
{
zak
}
has a measurable graph on (A, Σ, µ).
Finally, by the Corollary of Proposition 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 60), this implies that the cor-
respondence Q : A → 2R
ℓ
that assigns to every a ∈ A the convex hull ConvQ(a) of the finite set
Q(a) has a measurable graph.
From eorem 3.5 it follows that C(E) =W(E) ⊂ CS (E). It is le to show that CS (E) ⊂ C(E).
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Now, let (f ,д) < C(E) be some non-Core allocation in E. Hence, there exists some S ∈ Σ with
µ(S) > 0 and a coalitional allocation (f ′,д′) with f ′ : S → Rℓ
+
and д′ : S → Rℓ such that
(i) ua (f
′(a)) > ua(f (a)) ≡ u¯a for every a ∈ S ;
(ii) д′(a) ∈ Pa for every a ∈ S , and;
(iii)
∫
S
f ′dµ =
∫
S
д′dµ.
Next, since Q has a measurable graph by Lemma C.1, we may define
QS =
∫
S
Q(a)dµ(a) (20)
We note that, by eorem 4 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 64), from the atomlessness of (A, Σ, µ) it
follows that
QS =
∫
S
ConvQ(a)dµ(a) =
∫
S
Q(a)dµ(a) ,  (21)
is a closed and convex set.12
We now claim the following property:
Lemma C.2 Without loss of generality, we may assume that
∫
S
д′dµ ∈ QS .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
∫
S
д′dµ < QS .
en there exists a subcoalitionT ⊂ S with µ(T ) > 0 such that д′(a) < Q(a) for every a ∈ T .
Note first that for every a ∈ A the convex set Q(a) ⊂ Rℓ is an (ℓ − 1)-dimensional subspace of Rℓ .
erefore, since for every a ∈ T : Pa ⊂ Q(a)−R
ℓ
+
, д′(a) ∈ Pa and Q(a) is (ℓ− 1)-dimensional, there
exists some vector z(a) > 0 such that
д′(a) + z(a) ∈ Q(a).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that z : T → Rℓ
+
is measurable.13 Since the production
correspondence P is integrably bounded from above by Definition 2.2(iii) it follows, therefore, that
the mapping z is integrable with z =
∫
T
z(a)dµ(a) > 0. en
∫
S
д′dµ + z =
∫
T
(д′(a) + z(a) ) dµ(a) +
∫
S\T
д′dµ ∈
∫
S
Q(a)dµ(a) = QS .
en there exists some integrable selection дˆ : S → Rℓ with дˆ(a) ∈ Q(a) such that∫
S
дˆ dµ =
∫
S
д′dµ + z ∈ QS .
Now, the coalition S improves upon (f ,д) through (f ′, дˆ). Indeed,∫
S
f ′dµ 6
∫
S
д′dµ <
∫
S
д′dµ + z =
∫
S
дˆ dµ .
is shows the assertion of the lemma.
12Nonemptiness of QS follows from the integrably boundedness of the correspondence P and, therefore, of Q. is
implies that all measurable selections in Q are integrable.
13is can be shown through an appropriate application of Proposition 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 60).
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From Lemma C.2, we may assume that
∫
S
д′dµ ∈ QS . erefore, there exists some integrable
selection д′′ : S → Rℓ with д′′(a) ∈ Q(a) such that∫
S
д′′dµ =
∫
S
д′dµ .
We conclude that S improves upon (f ,д) through (f ′,д′′) : ua(f
′(a)) > ua (f (a)) for all a ∈ S and∫
S
f ′dµ 6
∫
S
д′dµ =
∫
S
д′′dµ
Hence, (f ,д) < CS (E), showing the assertion of eorem 4.3.
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